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RONALD J. BACIGAL 
Implied Hearsay 
LAWYERS sometimes exagerate the significance of 
a single sentence or footnote in a court opinion.' At 
other times a single phrase may turn out to be a time 
bomb which subsequently explodes with far reaching 
result:i. Court watr.hers thus spend considerable time 
trymg to discer:ii what is implied within the literal 
language of a court's opinion. It is no small irony that 
one of the latest implications in a Virginia Supreme 
Court decision relates to the implications contained 
within an out-of-court statement that cannot be liter-
ally defined as hearsay. A modification of the hearsay 
rule, or at least the hearsay rule applicable to child 
molestation cases, may be contained within a single 
paragraph of the Virginia Supreme Court's opinion in 
Church v. Commonwealth.2 
In Church the defendant was charged with sexual 
offenses against a seven year old girl. The victim did 
not appear at trial, but the victim's mother testified 
that the child became preoccupied with sex and told 
her mother that sex was "dirty, nasty, and it hurt." 
Defense counsel's hearsay objection to this statement 
was overruled. In its review of the case, the Virginia 
Supreme Court applied the classic definitions of hear-
say and non-hearsay. 
HEARSAY-extra-judicial statements "of-
fered for a special purpose, namely, as asser-
tions to evidence the truth of the matter 
asserted. ":1 
NON-HEARSAY-out-of-court statements not 
offered to show their truth are not subject to 
the rule against hearsay, and are thus admis-
sible ifrelevant.~ 
The Court noted that the Commonwealth did not 
offer the child's statement to prove the literal contents 
of the assertion that sex is "dirty, nasty, and it hurt." 
Rather the statement showed the child's attitude 
toward sex, "an attitude likely to have been created 
by a traumatic experience .... Thus, the child's out-of-
court statement was not hearsay, but was admissible 
as circumstantial evidence tending to establish the 
probability of a fact in issue."5 1.e. the corpus delicti of 
a sexual offense.6 The Court's brief analysis correctly 
applied the literal definition of hearsay to the literal 
contents of the statement, but the Court did not 
address the more subtle aspects of applying the hear-
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say rule to assertions implied within the literal con-
tents of a statement. 
Implied assertions focus, not on the literal contents 
of a statement, but upon the message impliedly con-
tained within such statements. Certain implied asser-
tions are so obvious that common sense dictates that 
they be recognized as hearsay. For example: A poten-
tial buyer asks: "Is this pure heroin?" Tu which the 
declarant responds: "Do cops wear blue?" Counsel 
offering this statement may contend that it is not 
hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of the 
literal statement that police wear blue. The mere 
uttering of such words is seen as an objective fact 
from which the jury may or may not infer something 
other than the truth of the matter asserted. E.g. infer 
that the hroin is pure. Although the inference is 
rather ob,ious, this does not convert the inference 
into an asf,ertion by the declarant. Under this analy-
sis, if the ,iury is not asked to accept the literal truth of 
the matt.er asserted, then the statement cannot be 
classifir;d as hearsay. 
Such superficial analysis is not convincing because 
counsel, judge, and jury will recognize the clear mess-
age contained between the lines of the declarant's 
colorful language. Common sense dictates treating 
such statements as hearsay. Unfortunately, implied 
assertions also come in much subtler forms than the 
above hypothetical. In many situations it is difficult 
to determine when it is appropriate to take the declar-
ant literally, and when it is necessary to "read 
between the lines" in order to decipher what the 
declarant "really" meant. 
Consider the following hypothetical:7 The defense 
offers the statement of the alleged homicide victim 
who hugged the defendant and said: "I love you." 
Defense counsel may argue that such a statement is 
not hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of 
the literal contents of the statement. (Love being 
irrelevant to a homicide prosecution) Counsel will 
maintain that the mere uttering of the words (and the 
hug)8 is an objective fact and is thus circumstantial 
evidence from which the jury may or may not draw 
inferences. E.g., if a victim would not love her assr.il-
ant, then it can be inferred that the defendant is not 
the assailant. Defense counsel will point out that the 
prosecution is free to argue possible counter inferen-
ces. E.g., the expression of love may have been an act 
of forgiveness and thus does not disprove the attack. 
Under the defense analysis the jury is not considering 
hearsay, but is dischar[ring its traditional function 
when considering circumstantial evidence. I.e., the 
jury must choose between competing rational infer-
ences. 
The prosecution, however, may not accept a charac-
terization of the "I love you" statement as non-
hearsay. The prosecution may argue that the infer-
ence to be drawn by the jury is the very message 
contained between the lines of the declarant's literal 
statement. Thus the defense is seen to introduce an 
out-of-court statement that the defendant is not the 
assailant, offered to prove that the defendant is not 
the assailant. The difficult question for the judge is 
whether the assertion implied within the statement is 
hearsay, or whether the implication is merely a per-
missible inference to be accepted or rejected by the 
jury. 
Applying the above considerations to the Church 
case, the Virginia Supreme Court did not address the 
assertion impliedly contained within the child's state-
ment that sex was "dirty, nasty, and it hurt." What 
was the child trying to communicate to the Mother? If 
the child was "really" saying I think sex is nasty 
because I have had a traumatic sexual experience, 
then this is the very purpose for which the statement 
was admitted. The jury was asked to accept the truth 
of the child's out-of-court statement that she had had 
a traumatic sexual experience. When the statement is 
offered for the truth of the implied assertion the 
statement must be classified as hearsay. 
If the child's statement is not offered for the truth of 
the implied assertion, then the mere uttering of the 
statement must somehow be probative of an operative 
issue. From the uttering of the statement the court 
inferred the child's "attitude toward sex,"!• and from 
the existence of that attitude the court inferred the 
existence of a factual basis for the attitude (i.e., the 
occurance of the sexual act). 10 Stringing these infer-
ences together is a round-about way of reaching the 
same point reached by the concept of implied asser-
tions. Under either analysis the child's statement is 
relevant only if the statement is accepted as evidence 
that a sexual act occurred. Hearsay analysis would 
regard the statement as direct evidence of the act, 
while non-hearsay analysis would regard the state-
ment as circumstantial evidence of the act. This 
somewhat artifical distinction between direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence should not determine the evi-
dence's admissibility. Yet that is precisely the result 
reached in Church. Had the statement been classified 
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as hearsay, the statement would ~10t be admitted in 
the absence of cross-examination to test the child's 
sincerity, memory, narration, and perception of the 
alleged sexual ad. 
The failure to permit cross-examination of the 
declarant lies at the heart of the hearsay rule, but the 
dangers of denying cross-examination are also pres-
ent in Church's characterization of the statement as 
non-hearsay. If the child were on the witness stand 
the child could be asked: Why do you think sex is 
nasty? The possible answers include: (1) because such 
and such (the traumatic sexual experience) occurred; 
(2) because one of my friends said so; or (3) because I 
peeked in the bedroom and saw Mommy and Daddy 
doing nasty things to each other. These quite different 
answers demonstrate that it is not the child's attitude 
toward sex that is relevant. Rather, it is the factual 
basis of that attitude which may or may not be rele-
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vant. The factual basis of that attitude cannot be 
developed when cross-examination is denied. Cross-
examination is needed to test the child's sincerity, 
memory, narration, and perception of the factual 
situation which allegedly caused the child's attitude 
toward sex. The child's statement should be classifed 
as hearsay in order to protect the fundamental right 
of cross-examination. 
If a superficial formulation of the hearsay rule is 
mechanically applied, the rule may lead to the result 
in the Church case. If, however, the purpose of the 
hearsay rule (protection of the right of cross-exami-
nation) is given proper consideration, then the result 
in Church is difficult to defend in terms of Evidence 
Law. There are of course many legitimate interests in 
seeking to protect a victimized child from enduring 
the additional trauma of vigorous cross-examination. 11 
Such policy considerations may justify the result 
reached in Church. But the decision in Church is not 
openly based on a legitimate concern for the child. 
The decision is phrased wholly in terms of a general 
application of the hearsay rule. 
It is unfortunate that the Court did not utilize the 
Church case to clarify the Virginia position on 
implied assertions. The policy considerations in 
Church make it difficult to ascertain whether the 
decision was merely a hard case which led the Court 
to modify the hearsay rule in order to protect a young 
child, or whether the analysis in Church forbodes a 
relaxation in the general prohibition against the 
admission of hearsay evidence. 12 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The famous footnote 4 of United States v. Caroline Prod-
ucts Cu., ;304 U.S. 144 (1938) has produced volumes of analysis. 
2. V.L.R. (1985). 
3. Church at (original emphasis). 
4. Church at. 
5. Church at. 
fi. The corpus delicti relates to the body of the crime regard-
less of the identity of the perpetrator. Thus the child's statement 
is evidence that the crime occurred, but the statement itself does 
not link the defendant to the crime. 
7. This hypothetical is suggested in Broun and Meisen-
holder, Problems in Evidence 97 (West 2nd ed.). The Virginia 
Supreme Court is not alone in classifying such situations as 
non-hearsay. See, e.g., RridRes v. State, 247 Wis. :!50, 19 N.W.2d 
fi29 (194fi). 
8. Assertions may be contained within conduct as well as 
within words. The hug may simply be another way of saying "I 
love you." The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that nonver-
18 
bal conduct is a statement for purposes of hearsay only when 
the person intends the conduct as an assertion. Fed. R. Evidence 
801 (a). 
9. If the statement merely establishes the child's state of 
mind, it is academic whether the statement is classified as non-
hearsay or falls within the State of Mind exception to the hear-
say rule. See United States v. Southland Corp., 7b0 F.2d 1366 
(2nd Cir. 1985). (An outright assertion of one's existing state of 
mind is a hearsay exception. A statement which provides the 
basis for drawing a circumstantial inference as to the declar-
ant's state of mind is non-hearsay.) Whether the child's state-
ment is labelled non-hearsay state of mind or the state of mind 
exception to the hearsay rule, the inferences to be drawn from 
that state of mind remain the same. See footnote 10. 
10. The inferences to be drawn from the child's statement 
would not have changed if the Court had invoked the state of 
mind exception to the hearsay rule. State of mind is admissible 
direct evidence whenever the declarant's state of mind is an 
operative issue of the case. 1'his is not applicable in Church 
because mental distress is not an element of the offense 
charged. State of mind is also admissible as circumstantial evi-
dence when the state of mind supports inferences which are 
probative of an operative issue. The child's state of mind 
(whether it be labelled non-hearsay or a hearsay exception) is 
probative of the corpus delicti only if the court accepts the 
underlying premise that every state of mind inherently has an 
accurate basis in fact. With no independent evidence of the fac-
tual foundation, can the mere existence of a state of mind sup-
port the inference that there is a factual basis for that state of 
mind? The answer must be no, because an affirmative answer 
produces ludicrous results. I.e., an in-court expression of state of 
mind must be based on an adequate foundation and must be 
subject to cross-examination, while an out-of-court expression of 
state of mind would not have to meet these requirements. The 
Court would thus reach the anomalous result that the require-
ments for admitting out-of-court statements are less stringent 
than the requirements for in-court testimony. 
1 L See generally, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child 
Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 8:3 Columbia L. Rev. 
1745 (1983). 
12. Would the Court apply the Church analysis to hearsay 
questions not involving a young victim of a sexual offense? For 
example: The declarant made an out-of-court statement that 
"the traffic light was green." The statement is not offered to 
prove the literal truth that the light was green. Rather, the 
statement is offered to establish the declarant's "attitude" (state 
of mind) regarding the light. It can then be inferred that this 
attitude must have been based on some experience, i.e., viewing 
the traffic light. Therefore, the statement is admissible to estab-
lish the "probability" that there was an operating light at the 
intersection. If the operation of thr light is a material issue 
because of a party's contention that the light was inoperative, 
then the declarant's statement is circumstantial evidence that 
the light was in working order. This hypothetical use of "non-
hearsay" presents the same dangers inherent in the denial of 
cross-examination. E.g., if the declnrant were on the witness 
stand and asked why he though the light was green, his answer 
might be: ( 1) because I saw it; (2) because .mmeone told me; or (3) 
because green is my favorite color. 
